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Feminist Tweets to Trump
How to Find Commonality in Diversity
Abstract
The 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and first year of the Trump presidency 
have defied conventional politics in multiple ways. Among the many shocking 
deviations from modern political normalcy has been Donald Trump’s appeal to a 
sizeable minority of the American electorate, especially in rural and post-indus-
trial areas, to hitch their hopes for American greatness on stressing racial, class, 
religious, ethnic, and gender differences among citizens and pitting the interests 
of immigrants and foreign powers against those of a genuine (white) America. 
At this moment, it seems crucial to strategize ways to mend America’s shredded 
social fabric. “Feminist Tweets to Trump” offers models for pursuing that goal 
from an unexpected source: feminist theory and activism. There are few social 
movements or theoretical perspectives besides feminism that can offer so many 
robust examples of paradigms, frameworks, and mechanisms for conceptualizing 
and actualizing connections among groups and for seeking common purpose, 
both despite and through substantial differences in identities, experiences, and 
social locations. Feminist connection strategies include: (1) challenging rigid 
binary thinking about sexuality and gender difference; (2) recognizing how racial 
divides map onto hierarchies of power and status and undermining both through 
non-oppositional identity politics, intersectionality, and mestiza consciousness; 
and (3) finding commonality across nations and geographical regions by exposing 
shared structural relations and the invisible political histories that link people who 
otherwise share few life experiences, practices, identities, or cultural values.
Sally L. Kitch
Taboo, Spring 2018
Sally L. Kitch is University and Regents Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at 
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Introduction
 Months after the 2016 election, it remains clear that the Trump campaign and 
presidency have defied political normalcy in multiple ways. Among the most shock-
ing deviations from the practices that have defined American democracy in recent 
history are Trump’s divisive approach to racial, class, religious, ethnic, and gender 
differences among U.S. citizens, his distrust of foreigners, including U.S. allies, and 
his insinuations about threats from immigrants. Equally shocking has been the will-
ingness of a sizeable minority of the American electorate, especially working-class 
whites in rural and post-industrial areas, to hitch their hopes for American greatness 
to such divisiveness and xenophobia. For that minority, the Trump campaign ushered 
in political “incorrectness” as a new norm, motivating some supporters to celebrate 
hate speech and discriminatory, demeaning, even threatening acts against perceived 
enemies, within, beyond, and across U.S. borders.
 In the wake of the nastiest, most divisive American presidential campaign 
ever conducted, many Americans of different classes, races, and regions felt they 
were “living like housemates ‘no longer on speaking terms’ in a house set afire 
by Trump, gaping at one another ‘through the smoke.’”1 That fire has been further 
stoked by the ongoing politics of the administration, which continue to emphasize 
(and exacerbate) stark divisions and threatening differences. The partisan divide, 
in which “the other side” is increasingly regarded not just as different but also as 
evil, is more solidly than ever a proxy for differing views of race, multiculturalism, 
gender equity, sexual diversity, and other issues related to rights and inclusion. 
Against such a backdrop, progressive ideas about seeking the common good and 
finding common ground seem DOA in America’s new reality.
 Our best hope may be that at least some Americans—perhaps even some 
elected officials—will eventually conclude that the country’s drift toward misogyny, 
nativism, white supremacy, xenophobia, and hate speech and acts has gone too 
far. Perhaps it will become possible to deepen the nation’s understanding of dif-
ference and to re-forge necessary connections to advance a long cherished ideal 
of America’s greatness through its robust history as a nation of immigrants, as the 
most ethnically and racially diverse country on the planet (and one of the few in 
which citizenship is not a function of ethnicity), and as a society still struggling 
toward gender equity. It still means something that, as early as 1732, the British 
colonies housed the most diverse mix of European immigrants ever assembled in 
such close proximity. It is also significant that the Colonies presented those diverse 
Europeans (who did not yet consider themselves united by race) with opportunities 
to encounter American Indians and sub-Saharan Africans (not all of whom were 
enslaved) on a daily basis.2 Whether the country retreats to racial neo-tribalism and 
hunkers behind dividing walls or embraces the benefits and richness of that history 
may determine America’s legacy for some time to come. 
 In considering that prospect, it behooves us to recall history’s cautionary tales 
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about the use of difference as an incendiary political tool with disastrous results. The 
ignominy of slavery and Jim Crow, which is yet in operation, are but two American 
examples. Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s also springs immediately to mind, 
as does South Africa during the Apartheid era from 1948 to 1994, when strict divi-
sions between whites, blacks, and “coloreds” were asserted, maintained, and enforced 
through state-sponsored violence, larceny, unequal treatment, and imprisonment for 
dissidents. And then there was Rwanda, where citizens turned against one another 
in 1994 and 1995, resulting in the slaughter of nearly a million people (including 
babies) and the displacement of an additional two million to neighboring countries. 
Seven out of ten non-Christian Tutsis were murdered by Christian Hutus pumped 
up by their leaders on the ideology of Hutu Power. Because physiology had nothing 
to do with the conflict, the killers had to check national IDs in order to know who 
was Tutsi and who was Hutu and, therefore, whom to kill.3
 Equally dangerous, a citizenry convinced of insidious differences among 
themselves—by fiat, propaganda, lies, or officially stratified rights and benefits—is 
often easier to control than a united one. Focused primarily on disparities and 
competition among themselves, citizens may pay less heed to the machinations of 
the ruling class. This effect is evident in Trump supporters’ reported disinterest in 
investigating his possible financial conflicts of interest or collusion between the 
Trump campaign and Russian meddling in the 2016 election. Perhaps the current 
administration seeks to ease the burdens of governing by practicing a version of 
divide and conquer. Urging the populace to disparage and compete with one another 
across apparently unbreachable dividing lines for dwindling benefits may deflect 
attention from a government’s covert mission to serve the powerful through friendly 
policies and the unequal distribution of resources. That outcome is evident in the 
fact that 40 percent of Americans still don’t realize that Trump’s 2017 tax reform 
plan unequivocally favors the rich.4 Moreover, people disoriented by a barrage of 
unprincipled edicts about differences and an endless parade of stereotyped scape-
goats to blame for their woes “are more inclined to seek saviors,” thereby keeping 
those in power powerful.5
 If Trump’s political ambitions are built on such tactics, as it seems to date, it 
is entirely possible that his administration will make no sincere attempt to unite 
Americans across the political lines that increasingly reflect class, racial, ethnic, 
gender, and geographical differences, as well as attitudes about social inclusion. 
They may, in fact, do the opposite and continue to shred the nation’s social fabric 
and disrupt longstanding alliances around the world in order to bolster Trump’s 
popularity with his loyal cadre of disaffected white voters. But the majority of 
citizens who voted against Trump (and perhaps some disillusioned supporters) 
will see the nation’s future in a different way. They will want to resist further divi-
siveness and create counter-narratives that articulate America’s strengths through 
its internal gender, ethnic, and racial diversity, its incorporation of immigrants, 
and its strong international alliances with both Western and non-Western nations. 
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Those citizens will seek to stoke understanding rather than fear. They will want to 
construct bridges rather than walls.
 When that happens, it may come as a surprise to many—especially to Mr. Trump, 
whose misogyny seems unstoppable—that feminist thought and activism can be a key 
resource for mending America’s currently tattered social fabric. Too many politicians, 
pundits, and misogynist social critics have made damaging feminism’s reputation 
a favorite pastime over the past decades for most Americans to recognize what the 
feminist movement, which includes both social activism and theoretical analysis, 
has to offer. But the truth is that few social movements or theoretical perspectives 
besides feminism can offer so many robust examples of paradigms, frameworks, 
and mechanisms for conceptualizing and actualizing connections and for seeking 
common purpose, both despite and through substantial differences in identities, 
experiences, and social locations. That is so in part because the monumental task of 
conceptualizing and addressing the variety of challenges and oppressions faced by 
half the world’s population has inevitably sparked many conflicts, even fissures, over 
racial, class, ethnic, religious, sexual, and geographic differences, both within the 
U.S. and across the world. Indeed, those fissures have at times become chasms. As 
a result, feminist thinkers have through necessity devised and adopted a variety of 
tools and approaches for working across conventional divides. They have produced 
a raft of useful frameworks for addressing and understanding difference as distinct 
from divisiveness and for constructing connections without capitulation. 
 In this article, I will use the rhetoric of the Trump campaign and his adminis-
tration’s early months as a touchstone as I offer various feminist views about and 
approaches to the divisions the election has exacerbated. I will use the conventions 
of Twitter as headings in that discussion in order to convey key messages I hope 
the new president can hear. As I construct this analysis, I will both reveal the fault 
lines over difference within feminism and highlight the contributions of feminist 
thinkers and activists, including myself, who have struggled for decades to bridge 
those chasms and find commonalities in difference.
 Before I begin, I must offer a caveat. I use the terms feminism and feminist 
loosely and without any authorization to characterize a movement, set of perspectives, 
or worldview that really defies definitive characterization. I invite readers to think 
about feminism as a capacious and somewhat raucous tent, inclusive of a variety of 
perspectives and approaches related to (mostly) shared themes of social justice for 
all and the rights and full personhood of women. In the spirit of that diversity, I will 
select among myriad writings and other manifestations of contemporary feminism 
as a representative sample—rather than an exhaustive survey—of possibilities. The 
four million people who turned out around the U.S. and the world for the Women’s 
March on January 22, 2017, embodied the variety of women, men, and children 
who are still inspired by the (apparently endless) quest to achieve social justice and 
inclusion in the U.S. via a defense of women’s rights, agency, dignity, and talents. 
It is their spirit that I hope to capture in this discussion.
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#Feminist Tweets (1):
“to counteract misogyny and truly understand
the meaning of gender difference, bash binaries!”
 Trump’s campaign bombast and continuing tweets, displaying both lust for and 
revulsion by women’s bodies, have revived unwelcome memories of the bad old 
days of rigid oppositional thinking about sexual difference and gender role bina-
ries. Directly or indirectly, Trump has communicated the idea that women (besides 
Ivanka) are soft and weak, valuable primarily as sex objects for men to judge, use, 
and replace. In addition to bragging about groping women at will and taking on the 
disgraced sexual harasser, Fox News’ Roger Ailes, as an advisor, Trump has offered 
no apology for discarding wives, whose aging might remind people that he too is 
past his prime. He has also revealed that he never changed a diaper or took care of 
his own children. “It’s not my thing,” he said on “The Opie and Anthony Show” in 
2005 and again during the 2016 campaign. Men who do that “act like the wife.” 
According to Trump, men are supposed to be hard. They are in charge; they supply 
the money; mothers are supposed to bear “the physical and emotional toll of raising 
a baby.”6 Some pundits have even suggested that Trump’s 2018 budget proposal to 
Congress reflected this testosterone-infused idea of maleness vs. femaleness, as 
he proposed slashing or eliminating anything remotely soft, such as the arts and 
diplomacy (through cuts to the State Department) and beefing up everything hard, 
such as the military.
 From feminist perspectives, the bright line Trump imagines between male and 
female identities and roles says more about the gender delineator than about the 
realities of sex difference. An insistence on differences—even oppositions—be-
tween the sexes may be symptomatic of childish fears of the world of emotions 
and the messiness of life from which women are supposed to protect men. Flagrant 
displays of misogyny, sexual prowess, and male dominance of anything feminine 
may camouflage “a fear of pain, a fear of mortality, a fear of rejection and most 
of all a fear of inadequacy.”7 Confronted with a powerful female adult like Hillary 
Clinton, men stuck in that childlike (fetal?) position don’t want to be reminded 
of their emotional dependency on women. Instead of confronting the truth about 
themselves, such men attack, dominate, belittle, and deride women whose lives are 
not devoted to bolstering male egos or providing for men’s comfort. Clinton became 
(and for some is still) a lightning rod and surrogate for everything that threatens 
men’s tight control over their own lives, including the recession, unemployment, 
and baffling cultural changes. Even for women caught up in such men’s despair, 
Clinton seemed to embody the challenges of conventional gender-role disruption, 
possibly epitomized by public and legal support for gay marriage. Her candidacy 
triggered many detractors’ lingering nostalgia for obedient women who take a 
backseat to male power.
 Equally important for politics today, feminists also understand how insistence on 
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gender dichotomy and opposition provides ammunition for other divisive strategies, 
especially when gender difference is linked to concepts of racial dichotomy and 
opposition. That is, the ideology of sex/gender difference can become the prototype 
for oppositional thinking in many realms, as either specific gender characteristics 
or the assumption of gender dichotomy itself becomes attached to other issues. 
Abortion politics provide a key example. Feminist theorists “have carefully mapped 
some of the ways that structural racial inequalities and cultural understandings of 
racial difference shaped American women’s reproductive choices and possibilities,” 
as well as ideas about female identity. In Boston in 1972 (just months before the 
1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision), racialized fetal imagery in Republican 
campaign materials helped to transform anti-bussing activists into abortion foes. 
The same tactics were used in Michigan’s statewide referendum on abortion in 
November 1972. There, too, anti-abortion conservatives conflated anti-abortion 
sentiment with opposition to school integration and welfare.8 In such political 
campaigns, a white woman’s opposition to racial integration or civil rights became 
synonymous with her opposition to women’s control of their own reproduction. 
 So how should gender difference be understood? American feminism has 
historically included multiple perspectives on that question, some of which might 
be considered oppositional. What was once called difference feminism celebrates 
gender distinctions as the source of valuable identities and lifeways and embraces 
what difference feminists regard as markers of their sex: nurturing and caring labor, 
community-building, civic “housekeeping” and work for social justice.9 So-called 
equity feminists emphasize gender-neutral characteristics and observe that all the 
social prescriptions and sanctions that uphold conventional gender identities and roles 
would hardly be necessary if everything called “natural” about gendered behavior 
and proclivities were really so.10 Feminists in this camp further note that the gender 
binary itself, which supports conventional gender roles, does not fully capture the 
range of sexual identities and genitalia combinations possible among human beings. 
Despite maternity hospitals’ pink and blue blankets, the human world includes a mo-
saic of possible genitalia and gender identity combinations, fueled by physiological 
and hormonal variations, sexual orientation, and gender dysphoria. As Judith Butler 
explains, various “non-normative sexual practices call into question the stability of 
gender as a category of analysis” in this and other cultures.11
 Indeed, there are cultures that have historically eschewed gender binarism by 
recognizing three genders or other combinations of sexual identities and orienta-
tions. Among dozens of such cultures are the Muxes of Juchitán in Oaxaca, México, 
Scandinavian Valkyries, some shamans among the Inuit, the Hijras of South Asia, 
and the Two Spirit People among the Navajo and other Native American tribes.12 
Such cultures may also recognize gender fluidity that cannot be pigeon-holed into 
discreet categories.13 Recently, both Canada and Australia have decided to allow 
passport applicants to use an “X” to bypass the two-gender choice of sex on the ap-
plication form. Even in the U.S., where mainstream culture is stubbornly organized 
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around gender binaries, contemporary experiences and representations of sexuality 
and gender often disrupt reductionist physiological ideas about gender difference. 
Even traditionalists may toss the concept of gender binarism out the window upon 
hearing about a transgender male who becomes pregnant by his gay male partner, 
for example. 
 What’s significant for the current political situation is that the apparently dis-
tinct threads of difference and equity feminism mesh on many points. First, both 
perspectives reject the idea that gender roles and characteristics are part of natural 
law. Second, they contest men’s right to define women’s capacities, life purposes, 
or roles. The differences women might celebrate are those they define themselves. 
Third, both strains understand that equality requires neither sameness among women 
nor between women and men. Rather, as Nancy Cott explains, “feminism asks for 
sexual equality that includes sexual difference. . . It posits that women recognize 
their unity while it stands for diversity among women.”14 Indeed, the whole notion 
of equality exists as a mechanism for grappling with the many human differences 
within societies and even genders.
 Feminists of both camps and those in between also realize that polarization among 
women and between women and men is often an artifact of political manipulation, 
with political understood as a function of power structures and hierarchies. Catherine 
MacKinnon once asked, is gender simply a way to “sexualize [social] inequality 
between men and women”?15 She thereby highlighted the role of mandated gender 
difference in justifying patriarchal power, eliminating female competition with men’s 
aspirations, obfuscating women’s social and cultural importance, and pitting women 
against one another through their attachments to different groups of men.
 Because feminists typically recognize the interconnection of gender difference 
with power, they also recognize that gendered social and political positions are not 
only historically and culturally constructed, but they can also be deconstructed. 
In a less polarized America, that position could connect varied groups of women 
across the political spectrum and world of experience in recognizing the benefits of 
deconstructing gender binaries in order to enhance women’s economic and social 
rights and agency. Perhaps the current suffering of white working-class men—many 
of them Trump supporters—from economic displacement and opioid addiction 
could be a catalyst for such agreement, especially as many women in working class 
communities stricken by addiction face the challenges of supporting their families 
on their own. If the post-election smoke could be cleared, perhaps such women 
could see that the economic world we now live in needs less gender binarism and 
ridicule of women for “acting like men” and more social support for women who 
must shoulder unaccustomed responsibilities. Indeed, women across the political 
spectrum might also unite in helping men acknowledge that post-industrial societies 
like the U.S. may mean “the end of men,” as conventionally defined by brawn and 
physical labor.16 Trapped as he is in gender binarism, however, Trump is probably 
the wrong leader to help his supporters accept and adapt to that new reality.
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 Adopting nuanced feminist approaches to gender distinctions means reject-
ing totalizing, oversimplified, and dichotomous views of men and women. It also 
means recognizing the diversity of female identities and lifeways that can co-ex-
ist on common ground. Evangelical Christians, Catholics, atheists, northerners, 
southerners, heiresses, and waitresses can all be (and are) feminists. Feminism also 
reveals the ways that many issues are deliberately constructed around stereotypes 
of gendered (and racialized) identities in order to polarize political perspectives. 
Reclaiming feminism is a step toward disrupting those stereotypes, freeing both men 
and women from habitual “party lines” about political issues, such as abortion and 
welfare policy. Disrupting those habitual connections would, in turn, deepen public 
engagement with democratic processes and disrupt ossified political alliances.
#Feminist Tweets (2):
“Making America white (male) again will not make it great.
It never has. Those who believe in gendered racial
entitlement will be left behind. Please rethink!” 
 While reinforcing masculine prerogatives and feminine insignificance, Trump’s 
presidential campaign also promoted dichotomous and stereotyped views about 
race (as we have seen, the two are related). As a candidate, Trump relied on out-
dated clichés about crime-ridden cities in the U.S. and exaggerated the prevalence 
of black-on-white crime, all of which fanned the flames of old racial grievances 
among his white supporters. He persistently obfuscated progress in race relations 
and insisted instead that they were at the boiling point in much of the U.S., even 
the “worst ever,” with no acknowledgement of facts to the contrary or his own role 
in promoting a racist frenzy. Candidate Trump also implied that Christian whites 
are society’s (God’s?) intended leaders and that making America great again meant 
making America white again. That notorious anti-Semites and white supremacists 
like David Duke, Steve Bannon and his Breitbart crew, and the Nazi-sympathizing 
alt-right cheerfully signed on to the Trump campaign made those equations crystal 
clear. When Trump participated on July 27, 2016, in an “Ask Me Anything” Forum 
on a highly politicized sub-Reddit site called “The-Donald,” he demonstrated that 
he welcomed racists’ support. A Stanford researcher has traced many connections 
between The-Donald and blatantly xenophobic, racist, misogynistic, and white 
nationalist sub-Reddit sites.17 Trump’s tepid condemnation of Nazis at the August 
2017 Charlottesville demonstration and his insistence on the guilt of “both sides” 
reinforced such links.
 Such open and blatant racial stereotyping and touting of white supremacy has 
not been seen in the U.S. since the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, which is 
not to say that racism ever died. Indeed, political analysts have argued that racism 
among some whites went underground until the 2008 election and subsequent 
eight-year term of a black president led closet white racists to reconnect with their 
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bigotry. Donald Trump was among the first to reveal himself as one of them, as he 
relentlessly questioned a black man’s legitimacy as U.S. president by leading the 
so-called birther movement right after the election. Many argued at the time that 
the movement reeked “of racial profiling in which people of color face persistent 
questioning of their social belonging.” Trump and his allies thereby asserted the 
stark otherness of people of color and, by implication, condoned a social order 
predicated on “asymmetrical relations between differently racialized groups [as] 
endemic to the very concept and practice of U.S. citizenship.”18 Trump’s continued 
commitment to undoing everything supported by President Obama, from the ACA 
to the Paris agreement on climate change to the Iran nuclear deal and DACA, 
provides further evidence of this view.
 Such oppositional and antagonistic constructions of race cry out for feminist 
theories of racial difference and power. This is the logical next step from feminist 
analyses of the interconnection between gender dichotomies and racial dichotomies. 
Not only are racial differences often defined in terms of sexual and reproductive 
characteristics, but they also represent stratified sites of power and status that partake 
of gender inequities. Thus, a black female occupies a different social status than a 
white male, because of the interconnections of race and gender.19
 Feminist theory and activism can be useful for contemporary racial politics in 
part because feminists have often been embroiled in the vexed history of racialized 
power in the U.S. Even in the suffrage movement, which was arguably the most uni-
fying (and lengthiest) feminist cause of all time, racialized rifts developed as early 
as the 1860s. Elizabeth Cady Stanton played the race card when she objected to the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s male-only suffrage guarantee by arguing that enfranchising 
15 million educated white women would lessen the ill effects of empowering 2 mil-
lion black men who “do not know the difference between a monarchy and a republic, 
who never read the Declaration of Independence or Webster’s spelling book.” In 
1913, Alice Paul, founder of America’s Congressional Union (later the National 
Women’s Party), worried that the presence of black delegates at a key suffrage parade 
in Washington would reduce southern support for women’s suffrage. So, she ordered 
black suffragists to stay home. (That racist order did not prevent black journalist Ida 
B. Wells from marching alongside white women in the Illinois delegation.)20
 At least since the 1980s, racial difference has resonated as an urgent alarm 
bell among U.S. feminists, warning of the hazards of assuming common interests, 
roles, values, experiences, needs, or identities among the vast group of human 
beings populating the problematic social category women/female. That rocky and 
racially hierarchical feminist terrain was dramatically exposed and charted in the 
late twentieth century via the essays, testimonials, dialogues, art works, and poems 
comprising This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, first 
published in the U.S. in 1981 and now in its fourth edition (2015).21 This Bridge 
focuses on the legacy of misunderstanding between white women and women of 
color as well as on emerging conflicts among women of color in the U.S. The vol-
Sally L. Kitch 19
ume brought stark attention to the racism inherent in white feminists’ assumptions 
about themselves and perspectives on women of color, especially African American 
women, in their too-narrowly defined quest for women’s rights and opportunities. 
Cherríe Moraga, Gloria Anzaldúa, Merle Woo, Cheryl Clarke, Kate Rushin, Pat 
Parker, and two dozen other writers demonstrated how the middle-class white 
American ethos and lifestyle familiar to most white feminists has been lived, both 
in the U.S. and globally, “at the expense of people of colour.”22 Even in the book’s 
fourth edition, editor Cherríe Moraga—with a possible dig at Hillary Clinton—noted 
the continued myopia of “single-issue” white feminists who believe that breaking a 
“class-entitled glass ceiling” and “beating the boys at their own game” will “’trickle 
down’ to the lives of working class and poor women and children.”23
 Even when feminists tried to combat racism within their own movement and 
to counteract persistent white bias in conceptualizing and addressing racism in U.S. 
society, their efforts sometimes foundered. For example, the concept of identity 
politics was introduced as a feminist theory and practice by women of color, who 
intended both to identify and to counteract historical links between white racial 
identity and social power and to expand white American feminists’ understanding of 
their own racist assumptions about women of color. The phrase first appeared in the 
1977 Combahee River Collective Manifesto, whose black lesbian feminist authors 
argued “’that the most profound and potentially radical politics come directly out of 
our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression.’”24  
 Identity politics came with a significant downside, however. As AnaLouise 
Keating observes, it eventually produced definitions of gendered ethnic/racial 
groups as monoliths focused on fixed issues or concerns and adhering to strict 
party lines. Such “mono-thinking” promoted competition and antagonism between 
groups, however defined, and bred “new margins within margins . . . an ever-renewed 
process of differentiation, even fragmentation.” It also inadvertently reinforced 
conventional understandings of social power in terms of static binaries, such as 
‘margin/center,’ ‘oppressed/oppressor,’ ‘colonized/colonizer.’”25 Those unintended 
consequences suggested additional hazards that have assumed new importance in 
the current political climate. That is, identity politics can also become a refuge for 
the protection of racial supremacy (e.g., for whites) and provide mechanisms for 
objectifying and demonizing marginalized groups (e.g., black welfare mothers) in 
what Laura Gillman calls whites’ vivid “cultural imaginaries.”26
 Conservative pundits Alan Bloom, Roger Kimball, Dinesh D’Souza, and 
Lynne Cheney were quick to exploit such counterproductive possibilities of iden-
tity politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They pounced on what they termed 
political correctness. In books and essays and, in the case of Cheney, NEH policies, 
they mocked affirmative action and derided the celebration of multiculturalism 
and feminism in the U.S. In the process, they defamed the concept of “liberty and 
justice for all” as a leftist proposition rather than a value schoolchildren pledge 
allegiance to every morning.27 In shifting the focus from combatting actual racism 
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in the U.S. to demeaning those who work for social justice, such attacks on political 
correctness and accompanying calls for color-blindness sidestepped the ontological 
implications of race—of black, white, and brown gendered and class-differentiated 
lives—and erased the complex realities of race-defined power struggles in the U.S. 
By politicizing the concept of social justice, those attacks also widened the rift 
between American political parties on the subject of race. 
 Candidate Trump seemed happy to revive the culture wars over political cor-
rectness, just as they seemed to be waning. His “Make American Great Again” 
slogan, which echoed the white supremacist and anti-immigrant rhetoric of the 
Ku Klux Klan, built on and celebrated the nation’s history of racialized power 
hierarchies. Instead of proposing to reduce the inequities suffered by racial minori-
ties, however, as many prior politicians of both parties once did, Trump’s slogan 
promised to amplify racial inequity in favor of whites. It preyed on white nostalgia 
for a utopian “past America that is specifically not racialized,” that is unburdened 
by political correctness, and that privileges “the overwhelmingly white, heavily 
blue-collar coalition now drawn to him” with intense loyalty.28
 Trump’s call to fight political correctness during the election also freed racists 
from feeling shame about their views, argues Lauren Berlant. Working class voters 
were “sold an ideology that hides the truth of structural inequality in an Oz-like 
image of capitalist democracy and individual sovereignty.” They didn’t realize 
“that their freedom was bought on the backs of other people’s exploitation and 
exile from protection by the law.” So, they took out their feelings of helplessness 
in a zero-sum approach. Their resentments led them to ask “why should group x 
matter more, or first, or get more attention” than people like me?29
 Because of feminism’s own struggles with racial difference and power, the 
movement has much to offer in today’s heightened struggles around race. Feminist 
theorists are revisiting the idea of identity politics and talking instead about a “non-
oppositional identity politics” that strives for “a metaphysics of interconnected-
ness.” This form of identity politics, outlined by Keating, focuses on differences 
but does not encourage differences to become binaries, us-against-them or narrow 
identity niches that exist apart from all others. Rather the new identity politics 
celebrates differences but also embraces insights about shared traits and goals 
among differently raced people. This form of identity politics emphasizes how we 
are all simultaneously oppressor and oppressed, margin and center.30 Through our 
own fragmented identities emerge possibilities for crossing conventional identity 
dividing lines and challenging assumptions about difference. 
 Mestiza consciousness does some of the same work as non-oppositional identity 
politics by expanding the potential benefits of fragmented identities. The concept 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s from the experiences of racially mixed citizens and 
cross-border cultures in the U.S. over centuries. Gloria Anzaldúa has been a prominent 
explicator of the social and personal struggles and benefits of a mixed or mestiza 
life and consciousness. She explains that those who live in categories that muddy 
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distinctions of geography, gender, race, class, or sexuality—i.e., in the “cracks in the 
world”—must negotiate both physical and cultural borders. They become mestizaje, 
the new hybrid, the new mestiza, a new category of identity.” Although mestizaje 
may suffer in the “shadow aspects and . . . liminal spaces” they inhabit, those spaces 
can promote growth. Through the contradictions and fissures in a hybrid existence 
can come light and insight. Because so many Americans share this situation through 
their hybrid heritages, a significant number can identify as mestizaje and “create new 
‘stories’ of identity and culture, to envision diverse futures,” according to Anzaldúa. 
“It’s about rethinking our narratives of history, ancestry, and even of reality itself.” 
Mestizajes should strive to banish the slash between “nos” and “otras” and “carry 
differences without succumbing to binaries.” “Through knowledge we question the 
limitations of a single culture/nationalistic identity.”31
 In this way, mestiza consciousness enters the political realm by confronting the 
myths and limitations of identity- or race-based American nationalism. If making 
America great again means making America a white (male)-entitled domain again, 
the sentiment is not only regressive, racist, and exclusionary, it is also ignorant 
and self-defeating. “I really think that ‘whiteness’ is a state of mind” rather than 
a matter of skin color,” Anzaldúa writes. It is “dualistic, supremacist, separatist, 
hierarchical.” She asserts that “the future belongs to those who cultivate cultural 
sensitivities to others” and to those who abandon rigid racial characteristics and 
embrace “the nos/otras imperative (of removing the slash).”32 She thereby suggests 
that those who remain attached to racial and ethnic binaries and deaf to the world 
views of people unlike themselves will be left behind. They will fail to take part 
in the pools of knowledge, resources, struggles, and histories that can enlarge their 
visions and enhance their survival. 
 Mestiza conocimiento provides an important opportunity for those who have 
suffered from hardship and exclusion. “Wounds cause you to shift consciousness,” 
explains Anzaldúa. “They either open you to the greater reality normally blocked 
by your habitual point of view or else shut you down, pushing you out of your body 
and into desconocimiento. . . . Using wounds as openings to become vulnerable 
and available (present) to others means staying in your body. Excessive dwelling on 
your wounds means leaving your body to live in your thoughts where you reenact 
your past hurts, a form of desconocimiento that gives energy to the past where it’s 
held ransom.”33 (Listen up, all white former coal miners!)
 The feminist theory of intersectionality addresses the myth of racial distinction 
and purity from a slightly different angle. Whereas mestiza conocimiento focuses 
on the awareness and experience of mixed cultures and heritages within individuals 
and groups, intersectionality focuses on the social and cultural structures that create 
and stratify bundled identities of race, class, sexuality, and other factors. That social 
scaffolding can impede or enhance individual and group advancement and agency. 
Thus, intersections of identity characteristics—white, middle-class male or working-
class Latina—create hierarchies among Americans in many social domains. 
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 As a case in point, Michelle Alexander demonstrates that the new form of Jim 
Crow—mass incarceration of young, poor African American males in the U.S.—is 
more about white expectations of that intersectional demographic than it is about 
the crimes they commit. Alexander argues that much of the increase in incarcera-
tion rates can be attributed to preconceptions about the social dangers implicit in 
the actions of young black men (think Treyvon Martin) as opposed to the innocent 
indiscretions of white youth. Thus, young black men are imprisoned for crimes that 
would likely be ignored or downplayed in the white parts of town. Coupled with the 
fallout from decades of residential segregation, “denizens of the ghetto” do not have 
the good choices that suburban, white boys enjoy. The U.S. has a choice, explains 
historian Lerone Bennett Jr. The white majority could seek the same opportunities for 
black youth that they seek for their own children. “Or we can choose to be a nation 
that shames and blames its most vulnerable and . . . relegates them to a permanent 
second-class status for life. That is the path we have chosen.”34
 The concept of intersectionality would tilt the U.S. toward another path. The 
contemporary origins of intersectionality theory are usually traced to Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s 1989 law review essay, which argued that intersecting racial, class, and 
gender identities create politically salient social meaning that “cannot be captured 
wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.”35 
Crenshaw demonstrated that black women were invisible in anti-discrimination law 
because their experience and treatment could not be articulated as either racial dis-
crimination or gender discrimination. An intersectional approach to such a problem 
would require examination of everything that structures the social positioning of 
individuals and groups, including both progress and victimization narratives, and 
interrogation of expectations about who plays what roles in society. Intersectional 
analyses also examine the ways in which various groups are characterized in the 
media, social policies, and academic research.36 Intersectional perspectives further 
require an active politics of inclusion and offer a tool for deep political coalitions, 
as chinks in the armor of single-axis identities become opportunities to unite across 
conventional lines of identity and power.37
 The message for Trump and his supporters from these feminist perspectives 
is that the racial divides and racism that the campaign and first year of Trump’s 
administration have fomented is an edifice built on sand. A stable foundation for 
the contemporary U.S. would be the granite of social diversity and inclusion. 
Intersectionality, non-oppositional identity politics, and mestiza consciousness 
suggest ways to actualize the goal of inclusion by forging linkages among people 
of ostensibly distinct racial, gender, class and other social identities. Instead of 
exacerbating divisions, these concepts provide guidance for combatting structural 
divisiveness. These theories and practices further suggest that U.S. politics and 
policies should build upon rather than deny Americans’ intersecting interests that 
transcend racial and other identity categories. 
 Feminist history illustrates how such transcendent politics has functioned, 
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even during the country’s most racially-divided eras. In the nineteen-teens, for 
example, some black and white women found intersecting interests, despite their 
oppositional understanding of race. They worked together in civic leagues, such as 
one promoting better housing in Baltimore, and sometimes in the suffrage move-
ment, even in the South. In Tennessee, for example, a mixed-race group of women 
realized the importance of the franchise for promoting their shared concerns about 
social services and civic housekeeping. There were also women who worked for 
social justice across racial boundaries outside of any specifically feminist cause 
or organization during the 1950s and 60s.38 In the 1970s, the National Congress 
of Neighborhood Women in Brooklyn, New York, was established to bridge the 
gap between black and white women by introducing them to issues they didn’t yet 
recognize they shared.39
 Instead of just staring at one another through the smoke across racial and class 
divides, diverse Americans could pursue such coalitions today. Feminist history 
even suggests that whites stand to benefit the most from building coalitions with 
minorities, because minority group members are more likely than majority whites 
to understand the impact of structural inequities on individual choices.40 Minori-
ties also recognize the potency of representations of racial groups by the media 
and politicians—the political creation of the black “welfare queen” of the 1980s 
is a prime example. Indeed, such representations have contributed to whites’ op-
position to government spending on poor people because they erroneously believe 
that the poor are “substantially more black than is really the case,” according to a 
2016 study. That misperception actually works against whites’ own interests, since 
non-Hispanic whites receive 69 percent of entitlement benefits, although they are 
only 42 percent of the poor.41 Thus, those coal-country whites who support Trump 
may be among the 45 percent of Republicans, or 25 percent of Democrats, who 
oppose their own safety net because they believe that blacks make up the majority 
of welfare recipients. (Maybe Trump believes that too. Could his mistaken percep-
tion that most food stamp recipients are black and, therefore, unlikely to vote for 
him be behind his proposed cuts in food stamps in his FY 2018 budget?) 
 Cross-racial coalitions could help dispel such misperceptions and guide whites 
away from knee-jerk support for gendered racial entitlement and toward political 
positions that actually serve their interests. In West Virginia, for example, white 
maleness cannot protect anyone from the realities of the state’s aging population 
and dependence on Medicare and the Affordable Care Act, which reduced the 
proportion of West Virginians without health insurance from 14 to 6 percent in two 
years. Added to the state’s dependence on federal programs and funding, which 
whites might once have associated with indolent minorities, working-class white 
West Virginians might want to rethink their apparent support for shrinking the 
federal government and overturning the ACA, especially as one in six workers in 
West Virginia is employed in the heavily federally-funded health care and social 
assistance sectors.42
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 Cross-racial coalitions could also help Trump’s working-class white female 
supporters see how the racial chauvinism promoted by Trump and his administration 
will not protect them from the effects of misogyny and sexism, even or especially 
within their own communities. Indeed, race and class solidarity has never saved 
women from the vagaries and injustices of gendered power hierarchies. Minority 
women know this phenomenon well, as Beverly Guy Sheftall, Johnetta Cole, and 
Andrea Smith have explained for African American and Native American com-
munities.43 That Trump doesn’t hesitate to savage elite white women with his crude 
misogyny is further evidence of the same hazard. 
 The anti-racist feminist theories and models discussed in this section deliver 
a knock-out punch to Trump’s racially divided vision for America. Evidence sug-
gests that the new president knows little about American history, yet he seems to 
encourage his supporters to dwell on an allegedly hurtful recent past and to choose 
nostalgia for a bygone (mythical) Golden Age, rather than to engage in constructive 
change in themselves and their circumstances. In so doing, Trump will not discover 
or restore America’s greatness. Rather, he will hold America’s greatness hostage. 
And even if the entire nation is forced to pay the ransom, the biggest losers will be 
the economically stressed, racially isolated white voters who supported him.
#Feminist Tweets (3):
“Putting America first is a tired idea, based in racism
and historical misunderstanding. It will not serve America’s
best interests. Shame on all chauvinism!”
 Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and early months in office have also 
challenged many of the norms historically shaping U. S. relationships with the rest 
of the world. During the campaign, Trump lashed out at existing allies, declaring 
NATO obsolete and promising to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico that 
Mexico would pay for. He also threatened to upend precarious balances between 
the U.S. and its adversaries, by undoing the nuclear deal President Obama struck 
with Iran, on the one hand, and promoting closer relationships with Russia and its 
autocratic leader, Vladimir Putin, on the other. He also condemned an entire reli-
gion by calling for a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” 
and proposing that American Muslims be required to register and carry IDs “just 
like the Nazis did with Jews.” (Apparently, he didn’t mind terrorizing Jews with 
that analogy.) Trump also demanded that terrorism be called by its rightful name, 
“radical Islamic terrorism,” with no euphemisms to hide its deep origins. He was 
further heard to say, “Islam hates us.”
 Since the inauguration, Trump’s actual interactions with the rest of the world 
have been equally unconventional, if not entirely consistent with his campaign 
rhetoric. On his first international trip, he abandoned the “radical Islamic terror-
ism” phrase and declared Islam “one of the world’s great faiths.” He cozied up to 
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his Saudi hosts, despite the fact that the Wahhabism that underlies many terrorist 
sects, including Al Qaeda, originated in their country. (So much for fighting ter-
rorism.) He touted a prospective arms sales deal with the Saudis to the somewhat 
inflated tune of $110 billion. (Was this his answer to replacing lost manufacturing 
jobs in the U.S.?) On his next stops in Europe, where he was ostensibly prepared 
to reassure America’s NATO allies about the U.S. commitment to the pact, he 
(intentionally?) omitted mentioning the keystone Article V, which states that an 
attack on one member is an attack on all. The omission rattled European allies. 
Back at the White House, Trump continued trying to craft a ban on Muslim im-
migrants that could better pass Constitutional muster, after his stream of tweets 
and lingering campaign rhetoric reinforced an “unmistakable and impermissible 
message that the United States Government disapproves of Islam and Muslims,” 
as Federal Judge Victoria A. Roberts concluded from the wording of his first ban. 
(The Supreme Court has already reinstated parts of the ban and might further bend 
the Constitution to Trump’s political will.)
 Trump’s preference for inconsistencies and erratic behavior with friends and 
enemies may be symptoms of a weak memory, a love of chaos, or a shallow under-
standing of international politics, or all three. But they are also emblematic of his 
promise to make America great again by putting America first. Like the “trickle-
down economics” Trump favors, putting America first in the foreign relations arena 
is a retread, however refreshing Trump supporters may find it. Indeed, Trump may 
simply be an unfiltered, unmoored, and self-aggrandizing version of an historical 
approach to building transnational alliances and on-again, off-again immigration 
policies on the basis of America’s short-term convenience.
 Putting America first recalls early twentieth century views that cloaked an 
abhorrence for the foreign-born in the rhetoric of recovering national greatness, 
which could only be achieved by distrusting foreigners and foreign influence and 
by scapegoating immigrant “others” for any decline in the nation’s prosperity and 
security.44 America-first-ness also channels the concept of American exceptional-
ism and Orientalist thinking that informed much U.S. foreign policy starting in the 
nineteenth century. Especially with regard to non-Western nations, such policies have 
often come with an unhealthy dose of cultural and political ignorance, stereotyp-
ing, and naïveté. Often the narrative about non-Western “others” went something 
like this: “We have reason; they do not. We are located in modernity; they are not. 
Significantly, because they have not advanced as we have, it is our moral obliga-
tion to correct, discipline, and keep them in line.”45 Women’s alleged status has 
played an important role in justifying ideas about Western superiority, as adherents 
to that view identified women’s advancement and equality as the cornerstone of 
Western democracy. As alleged evidence, politicians sometimes staged encounters 
between ideas about rights-bearing (us) vs. abject (them) women to justify political 
or military action. In such encounters, Muslim women were particularly pitied as 
victims of their cultures’ “savagery” and stagnation.46 Laura Bush demonstrated 
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that tactic in a 2001 speech that justified the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as a way 
to use American influence to liberate Afghan women.47 (A goal that never really 
determined U.S. actions.)
 Trump exhibited that familiar Orientalist proclivity on the campaign trail, 
when he belittled the appearance of Muslim Gold Star parents-- Ghazala and 
Khizr Khan—at the Democratic convention by focusing on Mrs. Khan. “[L]ook 
at his wife,” Trump intoned. “She was standing there. She had nothing to say. She 
probably, maybe she wasn’t allowed to have anything to say.” While overlooking 
the possibility that Mrs. Khan’s silence was an expression of her grief, Trump im-
plicitly contrasted women’s rights and behavior across cultures as emblematic of a 
clash of worldviews. He thereby implied that Mrs. Khan was, by superior Western 
standards, stuck in a backwards culture and, thus, possibly not a real American, 
despite her U.S. citizenship and the sacrifice of her American soldier son, Captain 
Humayun Khan. (In this comparison, Trump conveniently overlooked the silence 
and low public profile of his own wife.) 
 U.S. feminist activists and theorists know a lot about the toxic effects of such 
Orientalist attitudes because they have also internalized those ideas as byproducts 
of American identities and national pride. An example of this feminist Oriental-
ism was on stunning public display in February 2001, as Oprah Winfrey and Eve 
Ensler dramatically removed an Afghan woman’s burqa in Madison Square Garden. 
Through poetry and music, they celebrated the exposed woman as a triumph of 
Western values over those of a repressive patriarchal, tribal culture. But feminist 
offenses have also run deeper, as theorists and activists unwittingly imposed un-
examined assumptions about women’s rights, values, desires, and responsibilities 
from Western culture(s) on the women of the world, thereby avowing that women’s 
liberation “was based on ‘an expanded sense of “us.”’48
 Countering that Orientalism became the task of critics like Chandra Mohanty, 
who chided Western feminists in the 1980s and 90s about seeing all cultures through 
Western eyes. Others explained that a productive route to female solidarity across 
cultures and histories is not natural; rather, it “has had to be invented.”49 Over time, 
such critiques evolved into important caveats for future transnational feminist en-
gagement: differences of geographical location and culture may constitute different 
constructions of reality; there is no objective place from which to view women’s 
status cross-culturally; global feminism is suspect as a possible cover for spreading 
dominant Western conceptions of feminism around the world; feminists operating in 
the transnational NGO arena may be “femocrats” steeped in Western capitalism.50  
 If only Donald Trump could avail himself of these caveats and insights. Instead 
of reviving the habits of “arrogant perceiving,” stereotyping, willful ignorance, and 
us-vs.-them judgments of “others” characteristic of the imperial West, he might 
adopt a more curious and open-minded perspective. Instead of positioning him-
self as a world conqueror, he might instead reinvent himself as a world traveler, 
as Maria Lugones recommends. As a world traveler, Trump would be inspired to 
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see himself through the eyes of others, even U.S. allies, as he seeks to understand 
what it is like to be those others. As a world traveler, he might also try to “inhabit 
multiple liberatory trajectories” rather than to impose preconceived ideas about 
the shape of freedom from Western or American perspectives.51 Most importantly 
from a feminist perspective, instead of presuming to know anything about women’s 
status or desires, world-traveler Trump would refrain from characterizing groups 
of women at home or abroad without consulting them. 
 As a world traveler, Trump would also reflect on the current and historical 
challenges and conflicts plaguing his home country and hesitate to impose those 
problems onto the rest of the world. Because he is not and may never be a world 
traveler, however, Trump has no such hesitation. Quite the opposite. For example, 
in the early days of his presidency, he reimposed George W. Bush’s “gag order” 
(originally framed by Ronald Reagan), which forbade funding to any agency that 
provided or even discussed abortion with women, regardless of the agency’s overall 
mission. Among other consequences, that order halted U.S. support for the U.N. 
Population Fund’s program to fight cervical cancer, thereby inflicting America’s 
low survival rate from a very treatable disease across the continents. Such actions 
made America-first rhetoric into cold hard realities for the world’s women. Nicholas 
Kristof estimates that Trump’s decision “will kill two or three women” worldwide 
every few minutes. Such America-centered policies are even worse than Trumps’ 
misogynistic campaign rhetoric and “may cost more lives than in any other area 
of his governance.”52
 Adopting the world traveler perspective might also enable the president to 
understand how issues and crises that appear as isolated dots within faraway 
cultures or countries are not only interconnected but also involve America’s self-
interest on deeper levels than first glances might suggest. He could further see 
that international politics actually play themselves out every day within the U.S., 
as immigration, environmental threats, economic trends, and the repercussions of 
distant warfare inevitably cross boundaries—even oceans.53 The increasingly futile 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have forever marked the health and 
well-being of returning soldiers and their families and upended America’s moral 
stature in the world. The drought that led to the rising bread prices that provoked 
the Arab Spring in 2011, is a cautionary tale for U.S. food production in a changing 
climate. The refugees fleeing war-torn areas in the Middle East and South Asia, 
including from Syria and Afghanistan, not only challenge the refugee-welcoming 
history and conscience of the U.S., but they are also sobering reminders of the 
unintended consequences of U.S. actions on the world stage. 
 Feminism can also provide the new president models for transnational engage-
ment that could help him and his administration see beyond today’s challenges or 
crises. Feminists have over a century of experience in trying to address truly urgent 
issues that millions of women continue to face across national borders—such as 
sexual violence, economic and educational discrimination, limited nutrition and 
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health care, exclusion from governance and civil rights, sexual trafficking and slav-
ery. And they have learned the importance of understanding the history and larger 
social, economic, and cultural contexts—including the role of U.S. policy—that 
shape those issues. That experience has motivated feminists—perhaps more than 
other groups—to focus on ways to redefine interconnections and commonalities, 
while also respecting “multiplicative and concrete” differences in oppressions and 
circumstances.54
 For example, some indigenous women activists in the U.S., Australia, and 
Canada have joined together, despite dramatic differences in the particulars of in-
digenous peoples’ experiences across nations. They can find common cause across 
those differences because of one overarching status they share—their victimization 
by the cruelty and disdain of colonial settler nation-states. By the same token, the 
Third World Women’s Alliance, founded by the black women’s liberation caucus 
of the 1970s radical Black Power organization, SNCC, now includes Puerto Rican 
women in New York. Alliance members unite around their understanding that they 
are “interconnected through histories of imperialism and global capitalism.”55
 As with cross-racial coalitions in the U.S., such alliances need not depend on 
shared characteristics, identities, or life experiences. Rather they can focus on shared 
material-ideological facts and structured relations characterizing a particular situation 
or social milieu. Those relations both underlie and transcend people’s differences. Iris 
Marion Young calls her model for building coalitions around such structured relations 
seriality, based on Jean Paul Sartre’s definition of a series as a form of commonality 
created not by shared characteristics but by shared proximity and/or shared entrap-
ment within the structured relations of a particular situation or social milieu. Young 
illustrates a series with the example of people stranded by a broken-down bus. They 
can bond to arrange alternative transportation without having to reveal or overcome 
possible differences in their identities and life experiences. Being an indigenous 
woman in an historical settler nation-state is an example of a structured relation 
shared across national and even continental borders. Maya Goldenberg points out 
that individuals have interests across many such structured relations. Thus, they may 
find themselves in multiple coalitions across many issues and groups.56 
 Feminist research suggests that there are many more shared structural rela-
tions that could connect the dots across nations yet to be explored. In my work 
with Afghan women leaders over the past decade, which resulted in my 2014 book, 
Contested Terrain: Reflections with Afghan Women, I caught glimpses of such rela-
tions throughout Afghan history. For example, America’s Cold War policy knowingly 
sacrificed Afghan women’s expanded political rights and access to education and 
work opportunities achieved during the Soviet period. Anyone consulting Afghan 
women leaders at the time would have learned that even those who opposed Com-
munism still valued those freedoms. But no consultations were made—either then 
or before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which was ostensibly designed 
to liberate Afghan women. Nor was any U.S. support ever offered for Afghan lead-
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ers’ own work for women’s rights. Such support would be the best demonstration 
that Western powers consider those rights a cornerstone of democracy. Instead, 
American officials made common cause with misogynistic Islamic fundamental-
ists and other enemies of women’s rights in their anti-Communist zeal to expel the 
Soviets from Afghanistan.57 
 Many theorists have excoriated this hypocrisy of U.S. leaders, but few have 
noted a possible parallel in the U.S. itself. That is, while U.S. policies were throw-
ing Afghan women to the sharks, a major backlash to the feminist advances of the 
1960s and 1970s was brewing at home. As documented by Susan Faludi in 1991, 
fallacious claims about the negative effects of women’s (exaggerated) social and 
political gains began dominating popular culture and political dialogue. Roe v. Wade 
became a focal point for that backlash as early as 1977. During the 1980s, weak 
or bogus studies alleged that depression was rampant among single career women 
and that discontent among married career women was making them abandon the 
workforce in droves to stay home with their children. Most damagingly, pundits 
declared that a woman had virtually no chance of finding a husband after age 30. 
Faludi demonstrated the inaccuracies of such claims and revealed that the real cause 
of women’s unhappiness, if it existed, was the on-going difficulty of achieving even 
a semblance of gender equity at work or at home.58
 Future research should probe these parallels between U.S. and Afghan women’s 
declining social status and agency during the last decade of the Cold War: Did 
U.S. officials discuss the impact on the precarious status of Afghan women of 
their anti-Soviet campaign and support for the mujahedeen? Was the anti-feminist 
backlash infecting the U.S. a factor in American officials’ rationales for sacrificing 
Afghan women’s rights? Or did U.S. dignitaries maintain the illusion of American 
women’s unfettered freedom in their own minds as they callously undermined 
Afghan women’s opportunities and rights? Or was women’s status even a topic of 
conversation? Whatever the answers to such questions might be, two apparently 
distant groups of women have reason to explore the possibilities that they shared 
structured relations during an especially volatile geopolitical historical period and 
probably still do.
 Such suspicious interconnections strongly suggest that, instead of rallying 
around the idea of America-first, contemporary American voters should demand 
that their leaders understand and connect events and trends that need connecting 
between the United States and the rest of the world. For example, as voters think 
about America’s responsibility for stemming the tide of immigrants and refugees 
confronting developed nations today, we should remember what feminists can teach 
about our country’s historical role in inflaming trouble spots around the world. 
That would help us understand the possible role the U.S. has played in producing 
the displaced persons from those spots who are now knocking on Western doors, 
including Afghan women who are in mortal danger from their associations with 
U.S. interests. We should be especially cognizant of the history of immigrants from 
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our southern border, many of whom were victimized by American policies that first 
admitted them as needed workers and then deported or disinvited them when the 
need subsided. Actions toward those immigrants in the present should reflect that 
history and not just pander to the biases and short-term memories of ill-informed 
politicians and citizens.
#Feminist Tweets (4): 
“The 2016 election wasn’t won so much as wrested from
the jaws of defeat. But just wait. Changing fortunes are inevitable!”
 This analysis would not be complete without an acknowledgement that femi-
nists and others hoping to find common cause in difference and social justice for 
marginalized groups have something to learn from Trump’s election as president. 
It is certainly true that the election would not have gone Trump’s way if it weren’t 
for the disproportionate power of Midwestern states to tilt the Electoral College 
in his direction. It is also true that Trump lost the popular vote by approximately 
three million votes, virtually none of which were cast by illegal immigrant vot-
ers, as he has claimed. And it is probably true that the Russians were successful 
in helping Trump win through their cyber-meddling, although exactly how that 
worked is not yet clear.
 But putting all that aside, there are lessons that those appalled by Trump’s 
election need to explore. The Introduction to this article offers a few, such as rec-
ognizing how dividing the electorate and pitting social sectors against one another 
empowers an autocrat. There is also much to be learned from predictions that 
someone like Trump could rise to power. Philosopher Richard Rorty penned one 
such prediction in a series of essays almost twenty years ago. In a volume entitled 
Achieving Our Country, Rorty argued in 1998 that a focus by social justice advocates 
on cultural politics would eventually supplant the focus on real politics that had 
served the political Left so well. That shift would de-emphasize the needs of the 
non-urban working class, who were losing out economically and socially through 
static wages, vanishing manufacturing jobs, and increasing economic inequality. 
As a result, suburban white-collar workers, who would resist letting “’themselves 
be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else,’” would abandon “’the non-
suburban electorate.’” They would “’decide that the system has failed [them] and 
start looking for a strongman to vote for—someone willing to assure them that, 
once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, 
and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots.’”59
 Many elements of Rorty’s analysis seem right on target, although he did not 
foresee 9/11, the deepening racism that would accompany disaffected white work-
ing-class resentment, the degree of automation that would transform the economy 
across employment sectors, today’s ballooning wealth gap, or the financial crash 
of 2008. Many of those trends and events have complicated the causes of today’s 
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political spectacle. Nor did Rorty acknowledge feminist analyses of working class 
women’s activism, including feminist activism in labor unions, as well as the anti-
feminism of fundamentalist Christian women, all of which occurred well before 
his essays were written.
 Still, Rorty’s prescient depiction of the threat of “real political” discontent, not 
only to the Left but also to the foundations of American democracy, is a chilling 
reminder of what may be at stake in Trump’s divisive and isolationist vision for 
the U.S. Rorty further predicted that “’the gains made in the past forty years by 
black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will very likely be wiped out. 
. . . Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words ‘nigger’ 
and ‘kike’ will once again be heard in the workplace. . . . All the resentment which 
badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by 
college graduates will find an outlet.’” Trump’s election means that today’s outlet 
for such resentment is a man who admires autocrats and demagogues and seeds 
and feeds on resentment, xenophobia, conspiracy theories, revenge, and white male 
supremacy. We have reason to fear that American democracy has a dark road ahead, 
unless more humane and non-discriminatory outlets and resolutions for class and 
racial resentments can be found. 
 Yet Rorty’s predictions harbor another, possibly more heartening lesson: politics 
in the U.S. ebb and flow. Neither losses nor wins are necessarily permanent. What 
gets suppressed today is likely to reemerge in a new form in a year or a decade. 
The jubilation of 2008 and 2012 for Obama supporters became their despair in 
2016; just as the earlier (possibly racist) despair of some Trump supporters became 
jubilation in 2016. The swing of the political pendulum is not necessarily flattering 
to our system or to our electorate, but it is as predictable and discouraging as it is 
inevitable and encouraging. 
 If Trump is paying attention, he will realize that current support for his poli-
cies, edicts, and tweets, wherever he may find it, is unlikely to be the final word on 
the success of his presidency, even among his most ardent fans. And for those who 
oppose everything Trump, there is hope that forceful and persuasive counter-nar-
ratives and policy mitigations that advance their vision for American democracy 
might yet prevail—even endure, if right and true enough. Until that time, history 
suggests that both good and bad visions for the U.S. tend to meet the same end. 
They will be displaced, but they will not die. That’s both America’s tragedy and its 
best hope. 
#Feminist Tweets (5):
“Fake news: Racism, sexism, and nationalism are America’s
future. Real news: The future belongs to those who see 
opportunity in connection, change, and engagement
with ‘the other.’ It’s the American Way!”
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